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Abstract
We investigate how reputational uncertainty and the rate of change of the
social environment interact to influence cooperation in social networks. Reputa-
tional uncertainty significantly decreases cooperation and welfare, induces more
forgiveness toward defectors, and promotes opportunistic play. Compared to rep-
utational uncertainty, a fast-changing social environment only causes a second-
order qualitative increase in cooperation by making individuals more lenient in
imposing a network-punishment (link removal). The interaction between reputa-
tional uncertainty and a fast-changing social environment induces more lenient
strategies by reducing the frequency of action-punishment (retaliatory defection).
Although neither of them affects the aggregate network metrics, their interaction
decreases homophily among cooperators.
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1 Introduction
Understanding when and how repeated interactions lead to cooperation is fundamental
to comprehend many economic phenomena. Seminal theoretical contributions have
demonstrated that cooperative play is possible when individuals are sufficiently patient
(e.g. Friedman, 1971; Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986), and several experimental papers
have shown that people cooperate if the gains to cooperation are sufficiently large (e.g.
Dal Bo´, 2005; Dreber et al., 2008). Many of these studies, however, focus on a setup
with two players with perfect monitoring of actions abstracting away from some of the
features present in the real contexts where cooperation operates.
This paper examines experimentally the emergence and evolution of cooperation in
groups of individuals who can decide with whom to interact and have access to infor-
mation about their (potential) partners’ reputation. A first dimension we investigate
is the rate of change of the social-environment, defined as the frequency with which
opportunities to change one’s connections becomes available. For example, in an online
world there are frequent opportunities to change connections, and this can be done in
a snap of fingers, while oﬄine these opportunities may be limited by spatial constraints
or social norms. A second dimension we investigate is the presence of uncertainty on
whether other people’s observed action correspond to their intended action. In many
contexts, it may be hard to verify someone’s claim that they worked hard because per-
formance also depends on luck, or, conversely, a negligent behavior may accidentally
benefit someone. These two aspects have been investigated previously in isolation (e.g.
Fudenberg et al., 2012; Rand et al., 2011), but our paper, to the best of our knowledge,
is the first one to study them in a unified setting and explore their interaction.
In particular, in our experiment each subject is assigned to a group of 12 participants
who play a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. The participants are connected
by a network in which a link denotes a pair of subjects who play a PD game against
each other in that round, and each subject is constrained to choose either to cooperate
or defect with all their neighbors. At the beginning of a round, each subject has
the opportunity to remove some of her existing links and (or) propose new links to
others. The frequency with which opportunities to add (remove) links arises is one of
our treatment variables and it captures the rate of change of the social environment.
When making their decisions, subjects have access to information about the reputation
1
of each of their connections in the form of their last five actions. A second treatment
variable is uncertainty on the veracity of this reputational information.
Our first finding is that reputational uncertainty has a first order effect on coop-
eration and average welfare, while the rate of change of the social environment has,
at best, a second order effect. Specifically, cooperation and average welfare signifi-
cantly decrease with reputational uncertainty, while they only qualitatively increase in
a fast-changing social environment.
Given that the action choices of players co-evolve with the interaction structure,
there are two levers for individuals to punish defectors and enhance cooperation. Net-
work punishment deters defectors with the threat of having their links with cooperators
removed and (or) avoiding connections with defectors. The use of network punishment
has been previously documented in studies involving endogenous updates to the inter-
action neighborhood without uncertainty (e.g. Rand et al., 2011). Action punishment
is the standard threat of responding to a defector by engaging in retaliatory defection,
which in this set-up is less targeted than the network punishment because not only the
defector, but also the cooperative neighbors are affected by the retaliatory defection.
By exploring how the use of network and action punishments vary with our treatment
variables, we can shed light on the impact of reputational uncertainty on cooperative
behavior.
Network punishment is less effective when there is reputational uncertainty be-
cause participants are more lenient and forgiving towards defectors, particularly in a
fast-changing social environment. The concepts of leniency and forgiveness we employ
in our setting are adaptations of the notions formulated in Fudenberg et al. (2012)
for two-player games. In a fast-changing social environment, reputational uncertainty
makes individuals employ lenient strategies – subjects are less likely to terminate an
existing relationship with someone having a history of low cooperative play in an envi-
ronment with uncertainty than without it. In the presence of reputational uncertainty,
strategies are more forgiving as subjects are more likely to propose a link to someone
with a history of low cooperative play independent of the rate of change of the social
environment.
Our results point toward a behavioral asymmetry in the context of leniency and
forgiveness with reputational uncertainty in a slow-changing social environment. Par-
ticipants tend to react to a neighbor’s defection by terminating the relationship, but
2
they are more willing to give a second chance to potential neighbors with whom they
are not connected yet.
Action punishment increases with reputational uncertainty in a fast-changing social
environment. Specifically, given a proportion of defectors among their connections, a
participant is more likely to switch from cooperation to defection in an uncertain and
fast-changing social environment. A related finding is that reputational uncertainty
promotes opportunistic play: participants have a higher tendency to defect after a
history of highly cooperative play than in a setting without uncertainty because they
can hide behind the uncertainty which makes it difficult for others to infer whether the
defection was intentional or not.
Finally, we examine the impact of the rate of change of the social environment and
reputational uncertainty on the emerging network structure. At aggregate level, there
are no differences in network structure across treatments. Previous studies (e.g. Gallo
and Yan, 2015; Gallo et al., 2019) have shown that reputational information and a fast-
changing social environment increase cooperation by enabling the formation of clusters
of cooperators who associate with each other. We find that reputational uncertainty
undermines this process in a fast-changing social environment because defectors are
more likely to remain embedded in cooperators’ neighborhoods thereby creating an
obstacle to the formation of the cooperative clusters that would have driven up the
cooperation level and average welfare of the whole group.
This paper contributes to a growing literature that sits at the intersection of, first,
the vast body of work investigating the emergence and sustenance of cooperation using
variations of the PD and, second, research on how networks affect behavior and eco-
nomic activity. These literature span different disciplines and it is not feasible to have
an exhaustive review of all related contributions here. We aim, therefore, to position
our paper in the context of the most relevant contributions with a bias toward the
economic literature.
In experiments with an infinitely repeated two-player PD game under imperfect
public monitoring, Aoyagi and Fre´chette (2009) show that subjects cooperate in an
environment with a continuous public signal, and that their payoff decreases with
the level of noise in the public signal. Fudenberg et al. (2012) study a model of
a repeated PD with reputational uncertainty in players’ actions and observe that,
compared to the setting with no uncertainty, individuals are slow to anger and fast
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to forgive. Specifically, with uncertainty subjects use strategies that, firstly, do not
prescribe reverting to punishment after a single bad signal, and secondly, entail a
return to cooperation after punishing the opponent. Aoyagi et al. (2019) find similar
behavior with private monitoring.1,2
Beyond two-person games with uncertainty, Ambrus and Greiner (2012) study the
effects of a costly punishment option on cooperation and social welfare in long, finitely
repeated three-person public good contribution games. They show that the strong
positive effects of increasing the severity of punishment as identified in Nikiforakis and
Normann (2008) and Egas and Riedl (2008) do not hold when there is uncertainty.
With five-person repeated public goods game with imperfect monitoring, Ambrus and
Greiner (2017) further investigate the impact of democratic punishment, when members
of a group decide by majority voting whether to inflict punishment on another member,
relative to individual peer-to-peer punishment. Our contribution to this strand of work
on cooperation in groups in an uncertain reputational environment is to introduce
the possibility for individuals to choose whom to interact with given their (possibly
imprecise) information on others’ reputation.
When there is perfect monitoring of others’ actions, recent research has demon-
strated that the freedom to choose whom to interact with has a positive impact on
efficiency in games of cooperation and coordination. Rand et al. (2011) and Wang
et al. (2012) find that when subjects can update their links frequently, cooperation is
maintained at a high level with participants preferentially removing links with defectors
and forming new links with cooperators. Shirado et al. (2013) report that high coop-
eration is achieved at intermediate frequency of link updating.3 Gallo and Yan (2015)
further show that in this context knowledge about everybody’s reputation is crucial to
achieve a high level of cooperation.4 Our study contributes to this growing literature
1Early experimental studies have explored the effect of manipulating players’ information in re-
peated games in less standard ways. For example, Cason and Khan (1999) investigate a public goods
game where information on others’ contributions are presented with some delay. Bolton et al. (2005)
study cooperation in an environment with limited information about reputation. Bereby-Meyer and
Roth (2006) consider a repeated PD game with noisy payoffs, even though in their experiment players
could monitor others’ past actions perfectly.
2Related studies of repeated PD games under uncertainty include Rojas (2012), Rand et al. (2015),
Embrey et al. (2013), and Arechar et al. (2017).
3When the frequency is too low, subjects choose to have many links, even if they attach to defectors.
When it is too high, cooperators cannot detach from defectors as much as defectors re-attach and,
hence, subjects resort to behavioral reciprocity and switch their behavior to defection.
4A substantial related literature studies how endogenous group formation affects play in PD, public
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by introducing reputational uncertainty to investigate how it affects the effectiveness
of the network formation mechanism in sustaining cooperation.
With regards to the role of punishment in inducing cooperation, starting with Fehr
and Ga¨chter (2000), a vast literature has demonstrated that the possibility of costly
punishment facilitates increased cooperation in social dilemma situations. However, in
the presence of noise, Ambrus and Greiner (2012) show that costly punishment is less
effective in establishing cooperation. In our set-up, the only way to target punishment
to a specific defector is by link removal, and therefore we investigate whether this type
of punishment mechanism is less effective once we introduce reputational uncertainty.
An alternative form of punishment which has been shown to promote cooperation
is ostracism (Cinyabuguma et al., 2005; Maier-Rigaud et al., 2010). Under ostracism,
individuals can expel each other from the group using various voting schemes. The
expelled players are then excluded from the benefits of any cooperation undertaken by
those still remaining in the group. We can think of our set-up as allowing decentralized
ostracism through the removal of links by single individuals in an environment with
reputational uncertainty. Interestingly, we find that ostracism of defectors can occur
even with a decentralized system, but only when there is no reputational uncertainty.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the design
and procedures of the experiment. The research questions are listed in section 3. The
results are presented in section 4, and the last section concludes.
2 Experimental Design and Procedures
In our experiment, each participant is assigned to a group of 12 who play a game that
is repeated for 25 rounds with random termination thereafter. At the beginning of a
round each participant has the chance to propose and/or remove links with some of
the other group members. After the links have been updated, each participant plays
a PD game with the other participants she is directly connected to. We now describe
the protocol of the game in detail, which consists of three stages in each round.
Figure 1 illustrates the three stages that constitute a round. In the initial round all
good and weak link games. Contributions include Ehrhart et al. (1999), Hauk and Nagel (2001), Riedl
and Ule (2002), Coricelli et al. (2004), Cinyabuguma et al. (2005), Page et al. (2005), Gu¨th et al. (2007),
Ahn et al. (2009), Brandts et al. (2009), Charness and Yang (2014), Riedl et al. (2016), Yang et al.
(2017). See Choi et al. (2016) for a comprehensive review.
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participants are always linked with each other, but in any round thereafter (e.g. round
T in Figure 1) they may not. In stage 1 of round T, x random pairs of participants, i.e.
those drawn with dashed circles, may receive opportunities to propose and/or remove
links with each other. Suppose i and j is a random pair picked at time T , each of them
faces one of these choices:
• Remove the link if i and j were connected at round T − 1. Deletion of a link is
unilateral and does not require mutual consent.5
• Propose a link if i and j were not connected at round T − 1. Formation of a link
is bilateral and requires consent of the recipient of the proposal in Stage 2.
Stage 2 occurs if one and only one between i and j has proposed a link. Given that
link formation requires mutual consent, in stage 2 the recipient of a link proposal has
to decide whether to accept or reject it, as shown in the third row of Figure 1. Notice
that if two participants send a link proposal to one another in Stage 1, then the link
is automatically formed and there is no prompt.
In stage 3, participants play the PD game shown at the bottom right of Figure 1
with each one of their neighbors, subject to the restriction that they have to choose
either action A or action B for all neighbors.6 Choosing a single action simultaneously
toward all neighbors is a standard restriction employed in the literature to allow for
network effects, otherwise the network game becomes a collection of independent PD
games between pairs of players in the group.7 If a participant has no neighbors, then
she has no action to choose.
Once all individuals make their choices, they see the points they receive from the
interaction with each of the other participants. They receive zero points in this stage
from participants with whom they are not connected to. Subjects are also reminded
of their chosen action and the action chosen by their neighbors.
Appendix B shows screenshots for each of the three stages. For each participant,
the left area of the interface displays a visualization of their links to their neighbors in
5This is a natural assumption in the context of a relationship that is not legally binding and is
common in the economics literature (e.g. Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996).
6Action A is color-coded in green and action B is color-coded in blue. The colors are used as a visual
aid to distinguish the actions and have no meaning. Action A and B corresponds to, respectively,
cooperation (C) and defection (D). We used neutral labels A and B in our experiment to avoid the
experimenter-demand effect. In Figure 1 we denote A as C and B as D.
7See for example Morris (2000), Charness et al. (2014), Riedl et al. (2016), and Yang et al. (2017).
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Figure 1: Schema of the experimental design.
which the nodes are colored in either green or blue depending on whether their action in
the last round was to cooperate or defect respectively. The central part of the interface
shows the list of current neighbors with their past 5 actions, and, at the end of stage
3, the points obtained in the PD game with each of the neighbors. The right area of
the interface has the list of other participants who are not currently neighbors. The
bottom part prompts the participant to make the relevant decision in each stage, e.g.
the participants with whom she can propose/remove a link in stage 1 and the choice
of action in stage 3.
Each group of 12 participants plays at least 25 identical rounds of this game. After
round 25 there is a 50% chance of termination to reduce any endgame effects. Partic-
ipants’ earnings are based on 6 randomly selected rounds. For each participant, two
other participants are randomly picked for each of the selected rounds and the sum
of the points obtained in the interaction with these 12 randomly picked participants
constitutes the total sum of points earned by the participant in this part. Notice that
it is possible to pick an unconnected pair of participants and, in that case, the earnings
7
from that interaction are equal to zero.8
Following the completion of the first part of the experiment, participants take a Holt
and Laury (2002) multiple price list risk-elicitation test, and fill in a socio-demographic
questionnaire, which includes the standard interpersonal trust question taken from the
World Values Survey (WVS).9
The boxes with round edges in Figure 1 illustrate the two treatment dimensions
in the experiment, namely the updating rate (slow and fast) and whether uncertainty
is present. We conduct 4 treatments and use a 2×2 between-subject design to test
the impact of uncertainty under two different rates of link formation/removal. Under
no reputational uncertainty treatments, there is no uncertainty so participants receive
payoffs according to their own action and their neighbors’ actions. Under reputational
uncertainty treatments, there is a commonly known 15% probability that an intended
action is changed to the opposite action. Subjects are informed of their intended action
as well as their implemented one. However, they are only notified of the neighbors’
actual actions, and not what their intended one was. In terms of the updating rate
dimension, we consider a slow x = 6 condition in which only 9% of pairings potentially
change in each round, and a fast x = 33 condition in which 50% of pairings potentially
change in each round.
The data were gathered in 16 experimental sessions conducted at the Nanyang
Technological University (NTU) in Singapore, and the experiment involved 384 un-
dergraduate students from various majors. No subject participated in more than one
session and we used a between-subject design so that each subject participated in one
and only one treatment. There are 4 sessions for each of the 4 treatments. Each session
consists of 2 groups (networks) of size 12 for a total of 8 independent observations at the
network level per treatment. The choice of a group size of 12 ensures that the network is
large enough to allow the emergence of interesting structural features while at the same
time it is small enough to collect a sufficient number of independent observations per
8This random selection of pairs for payment, independently of whether a connection exists or not,
ensures that there are uniform incentives throughout the experiment in forming connections so the
payment system does not introduce biases in the emerging network structure. For instance, if we
had excluded unconnected pairs from the random selection for payment, then participants would have
incentives to form just one link with a cooperator to ensure that a specific pairing is picked. This
choice is counter to studies that pay the cumulative number of points participants have earned, which
may lead to satisficing in the later rounds and therefore lower incentives to change the network.
9The interpersonal trust question is: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”.
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treatment. The experiment was programmed with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007). Upon arrival, subjects were seated at visually isolated computer workstations.
Instructions were read aloud and subjects also received a copy of the instructions.10
Participants remained completely anonymous throughout the experiment.
The sessions lasted approximately two hours and participants earned on average
S$13.73 in addition to the S$2 show-up fee. Out of the 384 participants, 53% are
female, 62.4% are Singaporeans, and the average age is 21 years. About 23% of the
participants have had some prior exposure to Game Theory, exactly half of the par-
ticipants had participated in at least one laboratory experiment previously. From the
WVS interpersonal trust question, 22% believe that others can be trusted. In the
post-experiment questionnaire almost all participants state that they had no problem
in understanding the experiment.11
3 Research Questions
This section lays out several research questions that motivate our study. Given the
complexity of this repeated game on an endogenously evolving network, there is a
multiplicity of equilibria rendering theory alone insufficient to formulate precise pre-
dictions. However, for each question we provide a discussion of what we should expect
to find based on what we know from simpler theoretical set-ups and prior experimental
work.
As our experimental set-up involves repeated interactions without a known end-
point, insights from experimental repeated games suggest that there will be some de-
gree of cooperation (Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette, 2018). Starting from two-person cooper-
ation games and public good games without any network structure, the experimental
evidence is inconclusive for the aggregate level impact of uncertainty on overall cooper-
ation, although the majority of the studies find a negative effect. Aoyagi and Fre´chette
(2009) and Aoyagi et al. (2019) find that the presence of uncertainty results in strictly
lower cooperation. In contrast, Rojas (2012) reports that cooperation increases or
decreases when uncertainty is introduced depending on the treatment. In finitely re-
10A sample copy of the instructions for one of the treatments is provided in Appendix B.
11The descriptive statistics of the participants in each of the four treatments are provided in Ap-
pendix A.
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peated public good games, Ambrus and Greiner (2012) and Ambrus and Greiner (2017)
report that although uncertainty (in the observation of other group members’ contri-
bution behavior) leads to lower contributions, it is statistically significant for only a
subset of their treatments. Different from their setup, in our framework we have rep-
utational uncertainty caused by the presence of uncertainty on whether other people’s
observed action correspond to their intended action.
Previous experimental studies investigating a PD game in a setting with more than
two players and with an endogenous interaction structure have found that increasing
the proportion of links a participant can update in each round increases cooperation.
Rand et al. (2011) find that a fast-changing social environment encourages subjects to
break links with defectors and form new links with cooperators. Wang et al. (2012)
confirm this result by showing that there is a monotonic relationship between the
level of cooperation and how fast the interaction neighborhood can be updated by
investigating several values of the proportion of links that a participant can change in
each round.
We thus are interested in investigating how the two variables, that is, the presence
(or the absence) of reputational uncertainty, and the speed with which the interaction
neighborhood can be updated influence the level of cooperation and aggregate welfare.
Question 1 (Cooperation and Welfare): Does the level of cooperation and
average welfare decrease with reputational uncertainty and increase in a fast-changing
social environment?
Given that in our set-up mutual cooperation between two individuals is the only
way to produce social surplus, we expect that the presence of reputational uncertainty
will have a negative effect on welfare, and, in agreement with the studies mentioned
above, the level of cooperation and average welfare will increase in the fast treatment
compared to the slow one.
Next, network punishment is a primary tool to maintain cooperation when indi-
viduals can choose their interaction neighborhood (e.g. Rand et al., 2011). It entails
removing links with defectors and/or refusing to accept a proposal to interact from
someone with a history of low cooperation. Given the importance of network punish-
ment, it is useful to define the following two notions to analyze how it varies depending
on our treatment variables.
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Definition 1: Leniency . Strategies are lenient if, conditional on receiving an
opportunity to terminate a link, the deciding player does not terminate the existing
relationship with a neighbor whose actual action was C at most once in the last five
rounds (i.e, with a history of low cooperative play).
Definition 2: Forgiveness . Strategies are forgiving if, conditional on receiving
an opportunity to propose a link, the deciding player proposes a link to someone whose
actual action was C at most once in the last five rounds (i.e, with a history of low
cooperative play).
The notions of leniency and forgiveness in our setup are novel because they are
defined to capture variations in link formation/removal rather than action punishment
which is the focus in two-person PD games (Fudenberg et al., 2012; Embrey et al., 2013;
Aoyagi et al., 2019). In these studies focusing on two-person PD games, strategies are
defined to be lenient if they do not prescribe sure defection following a single defection
by the opponent, and forgiving if they return to cooperation after having defected.
These studies report that in the presence of reputational uncertainty subjects use
strategies that are both lenient and forgiving. This is in contrast to what Dal Bo´
and Fre´chette (2019) find in the perfect monitoring environment where grim-trigger is
one of the most frequently observed strategies. Given the experimental results in two-
player games, we expect the use of network punishment to decrease with reputational
uncertainty and therefore strategies to be more lenient and forgiving in the reputational
uncertainty treatments.
To the best of our knowledge, existing studies with endogenous interaction structure
do not formally analyze how the leniency and forgiveness in players’ strategies vary with
the rate of change of the social environment. Intuitively, when updating is slow, there
is a high potential cost of establishing or maintaining a link with a defector because
the opportunities to break the link are harder to come by. When updating is fast,
players can afford a more lenient and forgiving strategy, knowing that they do not
have to wait long to have another opportunity to remove the links should they remain
uncooperative. We thus expect that leniency and forgiveness are more prevalent in the
fast-changing social environment condition.
Question 2 (Leniency and Forgiveness): Are strategies more lenient and/or
forgiving with reputational uncertainty and in a fast-changing social environment?
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Action punishment is the primary channel to ensure cooperative behavior in two-
player games. It entails defecting as a response to a defection by the other player. The
following definition extends this notion to our set-up with multiple players in a linked
network.
Definition 3: Action Punishment . The likelihood of choosing D as the in-
tended action as a function of the proportion of neighbors who choose D.
Because the same action is implemented against all linked neighbors, action pun-
ishment is less targeted than network punishment and therefore we would expect par-
ticipants to opt for the latter to punish a defector. This is because choosing action
punishment would imply that the player chooses D against all her linked neighbors
even if some of these neighbors have been cooperative in the previous round. However,
the presence of reputational uncertainty potentially enables an individual to punish a
defector by defecting without necessarily losing her own reputation because others may
infer that the defection was not intentional.
Question 3 (Action Punishment): Is action punishment decreasing or increasing
with reputational uncertainty?
Another element that may undermine overall cooperation in the presence of reputa-
tional uncertainty is for cooperators to occasionally defect knowing that others would
be unable to ascertain whether or not the defection is intentional. We define this
behavior as follows.
Definition 4: Opportunistic Play . The likelihood of choosing D as the intended
action after a history of highly cooperative implemented actions.
Previous experimental repeated games have found that the presence of reputational
uncertainty can result in a higher share of players adopting non-cooperative strategies
like “always defecting” or a “defection-inclined version of tit-for-tat” ((Fudenberg et al.,
2012; Aoyagi et al., 2019)). While our set-up differs from these studies, it is reasonable
to expect that opportunistic play, which can be interpreted as a type of non-cooperative
strategy, should be more prevalent when there is reputational uncertainty.
Question 4 (Opportunistic Play): Is the level of opportunistic play higher in
the presence of reputational uncertainty?
A natural question in our set-up is how the presence of reputational uncertainty
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affects the evolution of the overall network structure as captured by standard metrics
such as average degree and clustering coefficient.12
Given the lack of prior studies that investigate reputational uncertainty in a network
setting, it is difficult to formulate precise predictions on its impact on the overall
structure of the network as there are opposite forces at play. If, for instance, we focus
on average degree then reputational uncertainty may increase it because some links
with defectors are not removed due to the uncertainty on whether a given defection
was intentional. Average degree could, however, also decrease if participants become
more wary in forming a link with someone who just defected, although the defection
may have been unintentional. We therefore are interested in answering the following
question.
Question 5 (Aggregate Network Structure): Do aggregate network character-
istics change with reputational uncertainty?.
Aside from its potential impact on the overall network structure, reputational un-
certainty may also cause a variation in the typical composition of the neighborhood of
a participant. Previous experimental studies have shown homophily based on cooper-
ativeness, i.e. cooperators tending to have more connections with other cooperators,
increases when there is endogenous network formation (Wang et al., 2012), partici-
pants have complete information about the network structure (Gallo and Yan, 2015),
and there is an opportunity to strengthen a connection (Gallo et al., 2019).
Whether the presence of faster interaction updating alone increases cooperativeness-
based homophily may depend on the specific payoffs of the PD game. Wang et al.
(2012) find that a faster updating increases homophily, but this result is possibly
driven by incentives to over-connect because two individuals defecting on each other
still receive positive payoffs in their set-up. Using the same payoffs as in our set-up,
Gallo and Yan (2015) find little evidence of homophily based on cooperativeness in an
endogenous network when participants do not have full information about the network.
Accordingly, we expect a similar level of homophily in the slow- and fast-updating
treatments. In the presence of reputational uncertainty, instead, cooperators may find
it more difficult to recognize each other and connect so we expect that reputational
12Degree is the number of connections of an individual, while the (local) clustering coefficient
captures the proportion of an individual’s neighbor who are connected to each other. See section 4.2
for the mathematical definitions.
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uncertainty will decrease cooperativeness-based homophily.
Question 6 (Homophily): Does homophily among cooperators increase or de-
crease in the presence of reputational uncertainty and in a fast-changing social envi-
ronment?
4 Results
This part of the paper reports the results of our experiment. Section 4.1 examines
overall cooperation and welfare. Section 4.2 investigates leniency and forgiveness in
network punishment, and section 4.3 looks at action punishment. Finally, section 4.4
reports how our treatment variables affect the emerging network structure.
4.1 Overall Cooperation and Welfare
We start by analyzing how cooperation and welfare vary at the aggregate level across
treatments. In the statistical analysis, we aggregate the data at the network level
so that there are 8 independent observations for each treatment. Then, we apply
the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test to compare across multiple groups to detect
treatment effects, followed by the Dunn’s (DT ) test to explore differences between any
two treatments.13 In this section, we report p-values for the Dunn’s test. The aggregate
analysis in this section focuses on rounds 2-21 and we exclude the last four rounds to
avoid any end-game effects.14
Figure 2 displays the evolution of the cooperation rate and average welfare over
time. The cooperation rate is defined as the number of pairs with mutual (intended)
cooperation at the end of a round, divided by the 66 possible pairs in a complete
network with 12 nodes.15 The average welfare is defined as the number of points
obtained by participants from all interactions at the end of the round. After some
13The choice of a non-parametric test with a small sample per treatment after aggregation is rather
conservative, and therefore any statistically significant finding denotes a sizable treatment effect.
14We focus on this time frame throughout, except in sections 4.2 and 4.3, where the analysis uses
rounds 6-21 when we condition the analysis on the last five actions played by subjects.
15Our results remain the same if we use the fraction of intended cooperators as the measure of
cooperation instead of cooperation rate. This alternate measure is defined as the ratio of participants
in a group who choose C (as the intended action).
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initial volatility, cooperation and average welfare in the different treatments tend to
stabilize over time, aside from end-game effects in the very last rounds.16
Figure 2: Cooperation rate and average welfare over time.
Reputational uncertainty leads to significantly lower cooperation and average wel-
fare. In the slow condition, reputational uncertainty reduces cooperation rate from
0.24 to 0.14 (p = 0.003, DT ) and average welfare from 3.85 to -1.91 (p = 0.017, DT ).
In the fast condition, reputational uncertainty reduces cooperation rate from 0.27 to
0.19 (p = 0.024, DT ) and average welfare from 6.81 to 1.53 (p = 0.028, DT ). The
impact of reputational uncertainty is therefore large and significant, and also consistent
with the majority of prior studies on PD games with two players.
The introduction of a fast-changing social environment increases cooperation and
average welfare holding reputational uncertainty constant, but the effects are at best
marginally significant. The p-values (DT ) for differences in cooperation rate and av-
erage welfare between the slow and fast conditions are 0.345 and 0.182, respectively,
without reputational uncertainty, and 0.071 and 0.132 with reputational uncertainty.
The findings from previous studies on cooperation in a dynamic network showing that
a fast-changing social environment increases cooperation (e.g. Rand et al., 2011; Wang
et al., 2012) are therefore not robust to the introduction of reputational uncertainty.
This is consistent with the recent evidence showing that the role of network formation
16End-game effects are common in games of cooperation (Ga¨chter et al., 2008; Ambrus and Greiner,
2012).
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is not robust to changes in the experimental environment (Rand et al., 2014) suggesting
that its role is second order with respect to reputation. Our first result is therefore the
following.
Result 1: Reputational uncertainty significantly reduces cooperation and average
welfare. A fast-changing social environment increases cooperation and welfare, but only
qualitatively.
Note that the effects we find are not driven by initial conditions. There is no sig-
nificant difference for the cooperation rate between any two treatments in round 1
(p > 0.1 for all comparisons, DT ). Because in all treatments the groups start, on aver-
age, from the same level of cooperation rate, it must be that reputational uncertainty
and the dynamics of network evolution are the factors that yield the differences in the
cooperation rate that emerge over time.
4.2 Leniency and Forgiveness in Network Punishment
We begin our investigation of leniency in network punishment by examining some
aggregate statistics. Using observations from rounds 6-21, Figure 3 displays the average
likelihood of removing an existing link, conditional on receiving an opportunity to do
so. We consider three different histories of a neighbor’s cooperative play: 0 or 1 C
(low), 2 or 3 C (medium) and 4 or 5 C (high). Unsurprisingly, when the existing link
is highly cooperative, there are very few occurrences of participants removing links in
all treatments (around 2% of the total observations in each treatment). However, in
instances of low or medium cooperative play of the existing link, a subject is less likely
to remove a link when there is reputational uncertainty or in a fast-changing social
environment.
We first test the effect of reputational uncertainty on leniency. To do so, we run
a random-effects logit regression with the dependent variable being the link removal
decision (= 1 if the link is unilaterally removed). We conduct the regressions separately
for the slow and fast conditions, and use the same three histories of a neighbor’s
cooperative play defined earlier. In all of these regressions we use observations from
rounds 6-21 and cluster the standard errors at the individual level.
The independent variables include the dummy variable for Reputational uncertainty
(= 1 if there is uncertainty), Round, and network metrics (Degree and Local Clustering).
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Figure 3: Average probability to remove an existing link, conditional on receiving an
opportunity, divided by the last five rounds’ history. Low : the actual action was C at
most once in the last five rounds. Medium: C was the actual action two or three times.
High: C was the actual action more than three times. The number of observations are
in parentheses.
The degree di of a subject i is defined as the total number of links that i has at the
end of the round. For each subject i, the local clustering coefficient measures how
connected i’s neighbors are, and it is formally defined as :
Ci =
2
∑
j,k∈Ni
gijgikgjk
di(di − 1)
where gij = 1 if a link exist between i and j and zero otherwise, Ni = {j|gij = 1}, and
di = |Ni|.
We also include Other Control Variables consisting of Age, Gender, the measure of
Trust obtained by asking the question taken from the World Values Survey (see section
2) to participants, the switching point in the Holt-Laury risk preference elicitation (Risk
Aversion), an indicator variable capturing whether participants have taken a game
theory course before (Game Theory) and an indicator variable representing whether
subjects have participated in experiments before (Prior Participation).
Table 1 displays the regression results. In the slow condition, for any history,
reputational uncertainty does not significantly affect the probability of removing an
17
Table 1: Random-effects logit regressions of the likelihood of participants removing ex-
isting links, conditional on receiving an opportunity and using last five rounds’ history.
Standard errors (clustered at the level of individual subject) are in parentheses.
Slow Fast
Low Medium High Low Medium High
Reputational Uncertainty -0.509 -0.414 -0.049 -0.920*** -0.857*** -0.124
(0.414) (0.267) (0.663) (0.344) (0.203) (0.329)
Round 0.041 -0.028 -0.018 -0.045** -0.006 0.008
(0.051) (0.026) (0.067) (0.020) (0.013) (0.026)
Degree 0.16 -0.131* -0.116 -0.061 -0.074** -0.141*
(0.120) (0.067) (0.216) (0.048) (0.036) (0.076)
Local clustering 2.637* 1.185 -0.285 0.319 0.825** 0.808
(1.467) (0.797) (1.905) (0.626) (0.353) (0.685)
Constant -1.563 -3.881** -2.454 2.987 0.129 -2.757
(2.852) (1.737) (4.092) (2.180) (1.065) (2.073)
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 508 754 661 1009 3735 4582
Notes: Low - the actual action being C at most one time in last five rounds; Medium-
C was the actual action two or three times; High- C was the actual action more than
three times; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level;
Other Control Variables include Age, Gender, Trust, Risk Aversion, Game Theory, Prior
Participation.
existing link (p > 0.1). However, this probability is significantly lower with reputational
uncertainty in the fast condition for low and medium cooperative play (p = 0.007 and
p < 0.001). Thus, strategies employed by participants are lenient only when there are
abundant opportunities to revise links, which happens when we have the fast condition.
On the contrary, in the slow condition, instead, there is a high burden of maintaining
a relationship with someone having a history of low cooperative play because the next
opportunity to break the link might only arise in the distant future.
To formally show the point above which claims that participants are more lenient
when updating is fast, we perform another set of random-effects logit regressions on
link removal decisions, by including dummy variable for Fast updating (= 1 in the fast
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Table 2: Random-effects logit regressions of the likelihood of participants removing ex-
isting links, conditional on receiving an opportunity and using last five rounds’ history.
Standard errors (clustered at the level of individual subject) are in parentheses.
No Uncert. Uncertainty
Low Medium High Low Medium High
Fast -1.002*** 0.083 0.088 -1.551*** -0.590** 0.092
(0.371) (0.230) (0.640) (0.358) (0.268) (0.569)
Round -0.043 -0.007 0.060** -0.048** -0.01 -0.087
(0.027) (0.015) (0.026) (0.022) (0.016) (0.053)
Degree -0.018 0.034 -0.220*** -0.045 -0.169*** -0.133
(0.071) (0.044) (0.082) (0.053) (0.046) (0.121)
Local clustering 2.067*** 0.513 1.734** -0.146 1.175*** -0.479
(0.802) (0.432) (0.784) (0.744) (0.446) (1.720)
Constant 2.598 -2.401* -4.551 1.919 -0.386 -1.296
(1.994) (1.238) (3.897) (2.259) (1.508) (2.692)
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 565 1490 3392 952 2999 1851
Notes: Low - the actual action being C at most one time in last five rounds; Medium-
C was the actual action two or three times; High- C was the actual action more than
three times; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level;
Other Control Variables include Age, Gender, Trust, Risk Aversion, Game Theory, Prior
Participation.
updating condition) while conducting the regression separately for the no uncertainty
and uncertainty conditions. Table 2 displays the regression result, showing that faster
updating makes individuals more lenient in maintaining a relationship. In the condition
with no reputational uncertainty, faster updating significantly decreases the probability
of removing an existing link for low cooperative play (p = 0.007). This probability is
also lower with faster updating in the condition with reputational uncertainty, for low
and medium cooperative play (p < 0.001 and p = 0.028).
Result 2: (i) Leniency increases with reputational uncertainty only in a fast-
changing social environment. (ii) Leniency is more prevalent in a fast-changing social
environment, regardless of the presence of reputational uncertainty.
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Next, we focus on forgiveness in link formation decisions. Using observations from
rounds 6-21, Figure 4 displays the average probability of sending a proposal (conditional
on receiving an opportunity to do so) for the three different histories of the potential
neighbor’s cooperative play defined earlier, i.e. 0 or 1 C (low), 2 or 3 C (medium)
and 4 or 5 C (high). As expected, the likelihood of sending a proposal is consistently
high, close to 0.90, for recipients with a history of high cooperative play. In contrast,
this likelihood is lower when a potential neighbor has a history of low or medium
cooperative play. However, when reputational uncertainty is present, a subject becomes
more willing to send a proposal to a potential neighbor who has a history of low and
medium cooperative play, suggesting that the subject becomes more forgiving.
Figure 4: Average probability to send a proposal, conditional on receiving an oppor-
tunity, divided by the last five rounds’ history. Low : the actual action was C at most
once in the last five rounds. Medium: C was the actual action two or three times.
High: C was the actual action more than three times. The number of observations are
in parentheses.
Table 3 shows the results of a random-effects logit regression with the link proposal
decision as the dependent variable (= 1 if the participant sends a proposal).17 The
regression results show that the presence of reputational uncertainty makes individuals
more forgiving when starting a new relationship. In the slow condition, reputational
17Specifications and controls used for Tables 3 and 4 are the same as Table 1 and 2 respectively.
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uncertainty increases the probability of sending a proposal to a potential neighbor
who had a history of low cooperative play in the last five rounds (p = 0.030). This
probability is also higher with reputational uncertainty in the fast condition for low
and medium cooperative play of the potential neighbor (p = 0.032 and p = 0.005).
Table 3: Random-effects logit regressions of the likelihood of participants sending
proposal to a potential neighbor, conditional on receiving an opportunity and using
last five rounds’ history. Standard errors (clustered at the level of individual subject)
are in parentheses.
Slow Fast
Low Medium High Low Medium High
Reputational Uncertainty 1.929** 0.288 -0.088 0.794** 0.767*** 0.565
(0.891) (0.360) (1.819) (0.371) (0.272) (0.413)
Round -0.064 0.043 -0.124 -0.059* -0.043*** -0.042*
(0.101) (0.038) (0.103) (0.031) (0.016) (0.022)
Degree -0.135 -0.188* -0.456 -0.152** -0.088** -0.175***
(0.254) (0.101) (0.403) (0.059) (0.037) (0.055)
Local Clustering -5.952* -1.066 -5.887 -1.315*** -0.566** -0.892**
(3.461) (0.840) (3.635) (0.510) (0.270) (0.386)
Constant -4.273 3.479 28.082** -3.181 -1.856 3.342
(9.080) (2.753) (11.647) (2.226) (1.607) (2.559)
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 381 436 329 1979 2623 2270
Notes: Low - the actual action being C at most one time in last five rounds; Medium-
C was the actual action two or three times; High- C was the actual action more than
three times; *significant at 10% level, **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level;
Other Control Variables include Age, Gender, Trust, Risk Aversion, Game Theory, Prior
Participation.
In Table 4, we test the effect of a fast-changing social environment on forgiveness
by performing a similar random-effects logit regression on link proposal decisions (by
replacing the treatment variable with Fast updating). For any history and both with
and without reputational uncertainty, faster updating does not significantly affect the
probability of sending link proposals (p > 0.1 for all comparisons).
Result 3: (i) Forgiveness increases with reputational uncertainty, regardless of the
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Table 4: Random-effects logit regressions of the likelihood of participants sending
proposal to a potential neighbor, conditional on receiving an opportunity and using
last five rounds’ history. Standard errors (clustered at the level of individual subject)
are in parentheses.
No Uncert. Uncertainty
Low Medium High Low Medium High
Fast 0.119 -0.531 -0.917 -0.265 -0.081 -1.131
(0.553) (0.356) (0.540) (0.528) (0.296) (0.723)
Round -0.036 -0.015 -0.057** -0.061 -0.035** -0.018
(0.040) (0.023) (0.024) (0.039) (0.018) (0.038)
Degree -0.182** -0.169*** -0.167*** -0.111 -0.070 -0.090
(0.082) (0.050) (0.061) (0.073) (0.045) (0.089)
Local Clustering -1.989*** -1.014*** -1.453*** -0.929 -0.508 -0.372
(0.682) (0.310) (0.529) (0.700) (0.366) (0.632)
Constant -2.311 1.791 5.562** -1.750 -1.512 6.842**
(2.502) (2.026) (2.682) (3.345) (1.770) (3.445)
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1211 1228 1670 1149 1831 929
Notes: Low - the actual action being C at most one time in last five rounds; Medium-
C was the actual action two or three times; High- C was the actual action more than
three times; *significant at 10% level, **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level;
Other Control Variables include Age, Gender, Trust, Risk Aversion, Game Theory, Prior
Participation.
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rate of change of the social environment. (ii) Forgiveness is unchanged if we compare
fast and slow-changing social environments, regardless of the presence of reputational
uncertainty.
4.3 Action Punishment and Opportunistic Play
Table 5 presents the results of random-effects logit regressions of the likelihood of
participants choosing C as their intended action. We limit the analysis to the subsample
of instances when a participant has selected C as the intended action in the previous
round, and focus on rounds 2 − 21.18 The dependent variable is the intended action
decision this round, which is equal to 1 if the intended action is C. It can be interpreted
as the likelihood of continuing to choose C as the intended action.
Specifications (1)-(3) focus on the slow conditions, while (4)-(6) investigate the fast
conditions. In the baselines (1) and (4), we only include the Round number, an Reputa-
tional Uncertainty dummy for the uncertainty condition and Other Control Variables.
Specifications (2) and (5) also include the fraction of a participant’s neighbors whose
actual action was C in the last round (Fraction of Cooperative Neighbors) as well as
the Degree and Local Clustering coefficient network metrics. Finally, in specifications
(3) and (6) we include the interaction variable between Reputational Uncertainty and
Fraction of Cooperative Neighbors.
The regression results show that the probability of continuing to choose C as the
intended action in a round is significantly increasing (p < 0.01 for all specifications)
in the fraction of cooperative neighbors and significantly decreasing in the number of
connections (p < 0.01 for all specifications). This holds for all specifications in both the
slow and fast conditions. Moreover, the interaction term is significant only in the fast
condition, and therefore action punishment is decreasing with uncertainty in a fast-
changing social environment, but it is unaffected by the uncertainty in a slow-changing
one.
These results indicate that action and network punishments are (partial) substi-
tutes, and can crowd each other out under certain circumstances. In the slow con-
dition, network punishment is not very effective given that opportunities to update
18For this analysis, we focus on rounds 2-21 as we do not need to condition the analysis on the last
five actions played by potential partners unlike in the previous analysis.
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Table 5: Random-effects logit regressions of the likelihood of participants choosing C as
their intended action this round, given that they chose C as their intended action last
round. Standard errors (clustered at the level of individual subject) are in parentheses.
Slow Fast
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reputational Uncertainty -0.763** -0.231 0.526 -0.667*** -0.200 0.902**
(0.304) (0.319) (0.515) (0.238) (0.241) (0.441)
Round 0.023* -0.027 -0.030 0.035*** 0.011 0.006
(0.013) (0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Frac. of Coop. Neighbors 3.921*** 4.679*** 2.754*** 3.669***
(0.396) (0.560) (0.326) (0.474)
Frac. of Coop. Neighbors -1.46 -1.708***
× Reputational Uncertainty (0.776) (0.608)
Degree -0.168*** -0.167*** -0.137*** -0.143***
(0.060) (0.061) (0.039) (0.039)
Local Clustering -0.036 -0.060 -0.026 -0.156
(0.560) (0.555) (0.355) (0.365)
Constant 0.172 0.359 0.157 2.453 1.590 1.017
(1.933) (2.124) (2.125) (1.517) (1.522) (1.540)
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1985 1985 1985 2335 2335 2335
Notes: *significant at 10% level, **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level;
Other Control Variables include Age, Gender, Trust, Risk Aversion, Game Theory, Prior
Participation.
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connections are infrequent so the usage of action punishment is unaffected by uncer-
tainty because subjects have to resort to it as their main avenue to punish defectors
even when past reputation is imperfect. In contrast, in the fast condition, network
punishment is effective, and therefore the introduction of uncertainty decreases action
punishment, which is less targeted and equally affected by the presence of imperfect
reputational information.
Result 4: Reputational uncertainty reduces the usage of action punishment in
a fast-changing social environment. Action punishment is a substitute for network
punishment when the latter is less effective in a slow-changing social environment.
To examine the prevalence of opportunistic play, Figure 5 shows the likelihood that
a subject chooses D, given a history of “highly cooperative” play defined as either at
least 4 C actions in the last 5 rounds (left panel), or exactly 4 C actions in the last
5 rounds (right panel). The probability of defection increases with the introduction of
reputational uncertainty in both slow and fast-changing social environments conditions.
In particular, we aggregate our data at the network level and compute the likelihood
of choosing D for each type of cooperative history. We then use a Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney (MW ) test to evaluate the mean difference in this likelihood with and without
reputational uncertainty, holding the rate of change of the social environment constant.
When at least 4 out of the last 5 actions were C, the likelihood of choosing D increases
with reputational uncertainty in both the fast (p = 0.021, MW ) and slow (p = 0.009,
MW ) conditions. Similarly, when exactly 4 of the last actions were C, the likelihood
of choosing D increases with reputational uncertainty in the fast-changing social envi-
ronment (p = 0.036, MW ), but only qualitatively in the slow-changing one (p > 0.1,
MW ).
In summary, the introduction of reputation uncertainty allows individuals who have
a good reputation to “hide behind the veil of noise” to engage in opportunistic play.
This rise in opportunistic play partly explains the drop in the overall cooperation level
when reputational uncertainty is present.
Result 5: Reputational uncertainty promotes opportunistic play.
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Figure 5: Probability of intended action being D given specific history of own actual
actions in the last five rounds. Two histories are shown: one where a player had at
least four occurrence of the actual action being C out of the last five rounds and the
other where actual action was C exactly four times in the last five rounds. The number
of observations are in parentheses.
4.4 Network Metrics and Homophily
Table 6 displays the average values for the following network metrics in each of our
four treatments: degree, local clustering coefficient and variance in degree.19 Similar to
Section 4.1, we aggregate all observations for rounds 2-21, and apply the non-parametric
Kruskal-Wallis test to compare the network metrics across multiple groups to detect
treatment effects, followed by the Dunn’s test to explore differences between any two
treatments.
The presence of uncertainty does not affect any of the network metrics. Specifically,
in the slow condition there is no difference in degree, clustering and variance in degree
between the treatments with and without reputational uncertainty (p > 0.1 for all
comparisons, DT ). Similarly, there is no statistically significant difference for the same
comparisons in the fast conditions (p > 0.1 for all comparisons, DT ).
Result 6: The aggregate network metrics remain unchanged whether or not repu-
19For each round and each network group, we calculate the variance in the number of links. Subse-
quently, we take the average of the variance over rounds 2-21.
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Table 6: Aggregate network metrics for rounds 2-21.
Treatment Avg. degree Avg. local Avg. variance
clustering in degree
(No Uncertainty, Slow) 7.49 0.71 2.89
(Uncertainty, Slow) 7.29 0.68 2.78
(No Uncertainty, Fast) 6.18 0.68 4.40
(Uncertainty, Fast) 6.73 0.71 4.85
tational uncertainty is present.
Our next goal is to understand how the presence of reputational uncertainty affects
homophily among cooperators, which is defined as the tendency for cooperators to
connect to each other. Following Currarini et al. (2009), suppose there are 2 different
categories of individuals i = 1, 2. Let Ni denote the number of category i individuals
in the population and let wi = Ni/N be the relative fraction of i individuals in the
population, where N = N1 +N2. Let si denote the average number of connections that
individuals of category i have with individuals who are of the same category and let di
be the average number of connections that category i individuals form with individuals
of categories different than i. The Homophily index Hi is equal to Hi = si/(si + di)
and it captures the fraction of the links of individuals of category i that are with that
same category.
A drawback of the homophily index is that it varies with population size so it is
not possible to use it to evaluate the extent of homophily for categories of individ-
uals belonging to groups of different sizes. To deal with this drawback, we define a
profile (s1, d1, s2, d2) to satisfy the baseline homophily if Hi = wi and inbreeding ho-
mophily if Hi > wi. The Inbreeding Homophily index (IH ) of category i is defined as
IHi = (Hi − wi)/(1− wi), and it measures the amount of bias with respect to the base-
line homophily as it relates to the maximum possible bias which is the denominator
1− wi.
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We classify a subject to be a cooperator if they chose C as their first round action,
20It can be easily checked that we have inbreeding homophily for category i if and only if IHi > 0.
The index of inbreeding homophily is 0 if there is pure baseline homophily and it is 1 if a group
completely inbreeds.
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and a defector if they choseD. This classification has the advantage that it is exogenous
to the evolution of cooperation in the group as it is fixed before participants receive
any feedback about game play. The average number of cooperators range from 6.63
to 6.88 across treatments, and there are no significant differences across treatments
(p > 0.1, DT ).
Table 7 displays the results of a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (MW) sign-rank test on
within treatment differences in the fraction of intended cooperative choices, average
degree, homophily index and inbreeding homophily index between the cooperators and
the defectors. As one would expect if our categorization into these types is meaningful
beyond the first round, cooperators have more cooperative actions compared to de-
fectors (p < 0.05 for all treatments, MW ). Moreover, when there is no reputational
uncertainty, cooperators have a higher degree and IH compared to defectors (p < 0.05
for both treatments, MW ). Once we introduce reputational uncertainty, cooperators
have a significantly higher degree and IH than defectors only in the slow-changing
social environment (p < 0.05, MW ), while the difference is only marginally significant
in the fast-changing condition (p < 0.1, MW ).
Table 7: The results of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (MW) sign-rank test on within-
treatment differences in the fraction of intended cooperative choices, average degree,
inbreeding homophily index (IH), and homophily index (H) between type-C and type-
D participants for rounds 2 to 21. We have n = 8 sample size per treatment after
aggregation at the group (network) level. The second row denotes the p-value from
the MW test
Variables Within-treatment differences btw C and D types
(
difference
p-value
)
(No Uncert., (Uncertainty, (No Uncert., (Uncertainty,
Slow) Slow) Fast) Fast)
Fraction of intended 0.209 0.233 0.211 0.242
cooperative actions 0.050 0.012 0.012 0.012
Average degree 0.852 0.857 1.497 0.673
0.012 0.036 0.012 0.069
Inbreeding 0.120 0.128 0.253 0.110
Homophily index 0.012 0.050 0.012 0.069
Homophily 0.166 0.182 0.273 0.183
index 0.093 0.208 0.012 0.093
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The introduction of reputational uncertainty significantly decreases the inbreeding
homophily index (IH) from 0.253 to 0.110 and the homophily index (H) from 0.273
to 0.183 among cooperators in the fast-changing social environment. We aggregate
the IH index for cooperators over rounds 2-21 and use a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
test to evaluate the difference in IH among cooperators with and without reputational
uncertainty holding the rate of change of the social environment constant. We find
that this difference is statistically significant in the fast (p = 0.046, MW ) but not in
the slow condition (p = 0.115, MW ).
Result 7: Homophily among cooperators decreases with reputational uncertainty,
but only in a fast-changing social environment.
This result is consistent with the conjecture we put forward in Section 3 when
we discussed homophily among cooperators. There we argued that with reputational
uncertainty, it becomes difficult for individuals to recognize the truly cooperative in-
dividuals, and therefore we should expect that cooperativeness-based homophily to
decrease in the presence of reputational uncertainty.
5 Conclusion
We provide empirical evidence regarding cooperation in an uncertain world with indi-
viduals receiving opportunities to update their neighborhood. Our experiments demon-
strate that the presence of noise, defined as uncertainty on whether other people’s
observed action correspond to their intended action, affects individual behavior along
the network as well as the action dimension. We further show that the extent of the
impact of noise depends fundamentally on the frequency at which individuals receive
opportunities to propose and/or remove links with others. In doing so, we extend our
knowledge on the characterization of behavior under noise with endogenous network
formation.
Our study raises a number of questions that suggest interesting possibilities for
follow-up studies as future research. First, we do not impose an explicit cost on form-
ing, maintaining, or removing links in our experiment.21 Exploring the effect of such
21Real-world relationships take time to form and maintenance of such links involves time and effort,
both of which are costly.
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cost might provide us with additional insights than mere opportunity costs of not in-
teracting as in our setup. Second, there are very few studies that investigate the effect
of allowing communication on cooperation in repeated games (Embrey et al., 2013;
Arechar et al., 2017). It would be interesting to study the effect of communication
in our framework. Third, noisy information is publicly observable in our setup, so
our game has an imperfect public monitoring structure. However, it is possible that
players do not even know what signals other players have observed about their own
play, thereby making the monitoring structure private. There are few empirical studies
on cooperation under private monitoring, e.g., Kayaba et al. (2016) and Aoyagi et al.
(2019) investigate two-person games with such a monitoring structure. Our setup could
be extended to include this type of challenging monitoring technology.
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A Demographic variables, by treatment
Table A1. Average values of demographic variables.
Treatment (No Uncertainty, (Uncertainty, (No Uncertainty, (Uncertainty,
Slow) Slow) Fast) Fast)
Age 20.91 21.31 20.84 21.01
Gender (Female) 57% 45% 59% 49%
Risk Aversion 5.42 5.62 5.91 6.03
Game Theory 25% 24% 23% 22%
Prior Participation 63% 46% 46% 47%
Trust 25% 17% 28% 20%
Risk Aversion shows the score from Holt and Laury (2002) risk-elicitation test, in which a score
of 0 indicates minimal risk aversion; Trust shows the percentage of participants indicating “yes”
in the standard interpersonal trust question taken from the World Values Survey (WVS).
Table A1 summarizes the main socio-demographic characteristics of our participants.
All 384 participants are students from various majors, ranging from humanities, social
sciences, economics and business, engineering and sciences, of Nanyang Technological
University (NTU) in Singapore. We verified that there are no significant differences
(p > 0.10) across the four treatments in terms of these socio-demographic characteris-
tics.
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B Experimental Instructions for (No Uncertainty,
Fast) treatment
Welcome to all of you! You are now taking part in an interactive study on decision
making. Please pay attention to the information provided here and make your decisions
carefully. If at any time you have questions to ask, please raise your hand and we will
attend to you in private.
Please note that unauthorized communication is prohibited. Failure to adhere
to this rule would force us to stop this study and you may be held liable for the cost
incurred in this experiment.
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You will receive SGD 2 show-up fee for
participating in this study. You may decide to leave the study at any time. Unfortu-
nately, if you withdraw before you complete the study, we can only pay you for the
decisions that you have made up to the time of withdrawal, which could be substantially
less than you will earn if you complete the entire study.
The amount of your earnings from this study depends on the decisions you and others
make and also on chance. At the end of this session, your earnings will be paid to
you privately and in cash. They will be contained in an envelope (indicated with your
unique user ID).
General Information
Each of you will be given a unique user ID and it will be clearly stated on your computer
screen. At the end of the study, you will be asked to fill in your user ID and other
information pertaining to your earnings from this study in the payment receipt. Please
fill in the correct user ID to make sure that you will get the correct amount
of payment.
Rest assured that your anonymity will be preserved throughout the study. You
will never be aware of the personal identities of other participants during or after the
study. Similarly, other participants will also never be aware of your personal identities
during or after the study. You will only be identified by your user ID in our data
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collection. All information collected will strictly be kept confidential for the sole
purpose of this study.
Specific Information
The total duration of this study is approximately 2 hours.
Your total earnings = earnings from Part I + earnings from Part II + show up fee
(S$2)
All incentives will be denominated in experimental dollars (expressed as ECU).
The exact conversion rate will be detailed later.
Part I
You and 11 other participants will engage in several rounds of interactions. Each round
is the same and consists of 3 Stages.
In Stages 1 and 2, you can form and delete links with any of the other participants,
which we will explain shortly. If you are linked with another participant then this
participant is a “neighbor”.
In Stage 3, you choose either action A or action B, and the choice of action A or B
applies to all your neighbors. Action A is color-coded in green and action B is color-
coded in blue. The colors are only a visual aid to distinguish the actions and have no
meaning. You get points for the action you choose and the action each of the other
participants chooses, in the following way:
You get 0 points if you are not linked with another participant regardless of your choice
of action.
The number of points you get depends on the actions you and your neighbor choose,
according to the table below:
Neighbor
You
A B
A 3 -5
B 5 -3
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This is what the table says:
• If you choose A and the neighbor chooses A, you get 3 points
• If you choose A and the neighbor chooses B, you get -5 points
• If you choose B and the neighbor chooses A, you get 5 points
• If you choose B and the neighbor chooses B, you get -3 points
At the end of each round you will see a summary of the number of points you get with
each of the other participants.
You will play 25 rounds of this game for sure. After round 25, there is a 50% chance
that the game will terminate in the following round. In other words, in every round
after round 25 the experimenter will “flip a coin” and if the outcome is “Heads” then
the game will terminate.
Stage 1 - Link Decisions
In Stage 1, you will have the opportunity to (i) form a link with another player who is
not linked to you or (ii) to delete an existing link with one of your partner(s). However,
you will not have the complete freedom to form or to delete links. In particular, 33
random pairs of players (out of the 66 possible pairs of players in this network) will be
selected to be updated such that:
(i) If you and another player that is selected are not linked currently, you will need
to decide whether to propose a new link between you two.
(ii) If you and another player that is selected are linked currently, you will need to
decide if you would like to delete the link.
For illustration purposes, the screenshots from Round 4 are shown (see also the attach-
ment (stage 1).
Top-left of the screen
You will see the following figure that visualizes your current neighbors.
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The neighbors you have at the start of each round are the same as the neighbors you
had at the end of the previous round. A link means that if you are linked to participant
Z then participant Z is linked to you.
Each circle denotes a participant with an ID. The “You” circle is always positioned
at the center. For example, above you are linked with Z, Y, Q, and N. The color of
the circles represents the last actual action (A or B) that has been chosen by each
participant.
Note that in Round 1 all participants are connected to each other.
Center of the screen
This table allows you to make your decisions to delete links in Stage 1. The first row
of the table (“Your Last 5 Actions”) reminds you of the actions you have chosen in
the last 5 rounds. For example, the sequence below means that you chose action A in
the last round (the leftmost), action A two rounds ago (the second-leftmost slot),
action A three rounds ago (the middle), and action B four rounds ago (the second
rightmost), and action B five rounds ago (the rightmost).
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For the pairs of players selected to be updated, a box will be shown next to the ID of
the participant. You can delete a link to the neighbor by ticking the corresponding box
under the “Unlink” column. There is no limit to how many boxes among the shown
boxes you can tick, and you can also choose not to delete any link by leaving the shown
boxes unticked.
The table has 3 columns, from left to right:
• “Neighbor”: lists the IDs of the participants who are currently linked with you
• “Past actions”: lists the last 5 actual actions by each of your neighbors
• “Unlink”: allows you to delete your link to the neighbors that have been ran-
domly selected by the system. For example, ticking the box in the last row will
delete your link to participant Z
The color-codings of the other participants’ actions are the same as before. The green
letter A denotes the choice of action A. The blue letter B denotes the choice of action
B. The “-” denotes that the participant did not have any neighbor in that round, and
therefore the participant did not choose an action.
Right of the screen
This table allows you to make your decisions to form links in Stage 1.
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For the pairs of players selected to be updated, a box will be shown next to the ID of
the participant. You can propose a link to the participant by ticking the corresponding
box under the “Link” column. There is no limit to how many boxes among the shown
boxes you can tick, and you can also choose not to propose any link by leaving all the
boxes unticked.
The table has 3 columns, from left to right:
• “Others”: lists the IDs of the participants who are not linked with you
• “Past actions”: lists the last 5 actual actions by each of these participants
• “Link”: allows you to propose a link to the participants randomly selected by
the system you are not linked with. For example, ticking the box in the last row
will propose a link to participant M
Bottom-right of the screen
Note that the participants whom you can propose or delete links with are decided
randomly by the computer. The text reminds you about the decisions you need to
make and lists the participants whom you can propose or delete links with. You can
propose new links and/or delete existing links, or you can choose not to propose and/or
delete any links. In either case, you need to click the “Submit” button to confirm your
decisions.
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Stage 2 - Yes/No Decision
In case you decided not to link to another participant in Stage 1 but this other partici-
pant has opted to send you a link proposal, then in Stage 2 we ask you to confirm your
earlier decision not to link to this other participant. You will be shown the following
table where you need to respond to link proposals in Stage 2.
Please refer to the attachment (Stage 2) for illustration purpose.
As in Stage 1, the table has 3 columns, from left to right:
• “Others”: lists the IDs of the participants who are not linked with you
• “Past actions”: lists the last 5 actual actions by each of these participants
• “Respond to link proposal”: allows you to accept or reject a link proposal
from a participant that is not currently linked with you
For example, look at participants P, S and T: under the “Respond to link proposals”
column a “No” and a “Yes” buttons appear. This means that P, S and T have sent
41
you a link proposal. For each proposal, you need to click on “Yes” to accept it or “No”
to reject it. In the example shown, you have chosen to reject the proposals from S and
T, and accept the proposal from P.
Note that if you have sent a proposal to connect to a participant in Stage 1 and that
participant has done the same then the link is automatically formed without the need
of further approval in Stage 2, and hence no button will be shown.
Stage 3 - Action Choice
In Stage 3, you choose either action A or action B. Please refer to the attachment
(Stage 3) for illustration purpose.
Bottom-right of the screen
This is where you choose your action in Stage 3 by clicking either the A or B button.
You must pick an action in order to proceed.
Note that it is possible that you are not linked with any participant (i.e. you have no
neighbor) as the result of yours and others’ earlier decisions. In such case, you will
instead see the message reminding you that you do not have any neighbor and so you
do not need to choose an action.
Action Outcome
After Stage 3, you will see a summary of the points you got with each of the other
participants in the round.
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The action you have chosen (intended action) during Stage 3 may or may not be
implemented correctly. Specifically, there is a 15% chance that your intended action
A is implemented as actual action B and a 15% chance that your intended action
B is implemented as actual action A. Note that other players only observe your
implemented (actual) action and not your intended action.
Please refer to the attachment (Action Outcome) for illustration purpose.
The table shows your neighbors and your neighbors’ actual actions in this round.
The first row of this table reminds you of your intended action and the actual action
implemented. For example, in the table below your intended action was A and your
actual action was A. Note that the table is updated with yours and the others’ decisions
in the previous Stages.
The table has 3 columns, from left to right:
• “Neighbor”: lists the IDs of the participants who are currently linked with you
• “Action”: lists the actual action by each of your neighbors in this round
• “Points”: lists the points you gained from your and each neighbor’s actual
action
If your intended action is implemented correctly, you will see the following box.
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If your intended action is not implemented correctly, you will see the following box.
You need to click the “Continue” button to move to Stage 1 of the next round.
Earnings in Part I
At the end of the Experiment, we will randomly select 6 rounds for payment. In each
of these 6 rounds, we will randomly pick 2 of your potential link pairs (There are 11
potential link pairs in total). Note that a participant who was not linked with you
can be picked, and in that case you will get 0 points for the interaction with that
participant.
To determine your earnings, we sum the number of points you got with each of the
picked participants in each of the 6 rounds. The exchange rate from ECU to SGD is:
1.5 ECU = 1 SGD
Part II
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In this part of the study you will be asked to make a series of choices. How much you
receive will depend partly on chance and partly on the choices you make. The decision
problems are not designed to test you. What we want to know is what choices you
would make in them.
For each line in the table you will see in this stage, please indicate whether you prefer
option A or option B. There will be a total of 10 lines in the table but just one line will
be randomly selected for payment. You do not know which line will be paid when you
make your choices. Hence you should pay attention to the choice you make in every
line.
After you have completed all your choices, the computer will randomly generate a
number, which determines which line is going to be paid out.
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you
chose option A in that line, you will receive 20 ECU. If you chose option B in that
line, you will receive either 60 ECU or 0. To determine your earnings in the case
you chose option B, there will be a second random draw. The computer will randomly
determine if your payoff is 0 or 60, with the chances set by the computer as they are
stated in Option B.
Earning in Part II
In Part II, the conversion rate from experimental dollars (ECU) to Singaporean dollars
is:
20 ECU = 1 SGD
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Attachment (Stage 1)
Attachment (Stage 2)
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Attachment (Stage 3)
Attachment (Action Outcome)
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